Infrastructure projects rarely fail because of one bad decision.
More often, failure emerges gradually. A project that appears commercially attractive at inception may encounter difficulties in procurement, approvals, stakeholder relations, contracting, financing or implementation. By the time those difficulties become visible, the underlying weaknesses may already be deeply embedded in the project structure.
The recent scrutiny of certain hydropower projects associated with KTDA Holdings Limited provides a useful case study in this regard. Read the full report: https://libraryir.parliament.go.ke/bitstreams/72ef7970-2b60-4c46-8cfd-7c825abf4763/download.
The issues raised in the National Assembly’s consideration of the projects invite a broader examination of a question relevant to infrastructure investors, public entities, lenders and developers alike:
What distinguishes an infrastructure project that is capable of attracting investment from one that is capable of being successfully delivered?
The distinction is more important than it may initially appear.
A project may be technically feasible. It may have a credible business case. It may secure financing. It may even have competent contractors and advisers.
Yet none of these factors, individually or collectively, guarantees successful delivery.
The missing ingredient is often project governance.
From investment proposition to operating asset
Infrastructure development involves a transition from an investment proposition to a functioning asset.
That transition creates a series of dependencies.
A project must first be sufficiently understood to justify investment. Its legal and regulatory environment must then be mapped. Land, approvals, procurement and contractual arrangements must be addressed. Financing must be structured around the project’s actual risk profile. Stakeholder interests must be identified and managed. Finally, the project must be delivered through an appropriate institutional and contractual framework.
Each stage affects the next.
A weakness in the early stages can therefore become considerably more expensive later.
This is particularly relevant in large or complex projects where the cost of correcting an error increases significantly once substantial capital has been committed or construction has commenced.
The central question should therefore not simply be: “Can this project be financed?”
It should be: “Has this project been sufficiently prepared and governed to justify financing and implementation?”
The importance of project preparation
The preparation phase is sometimes treated as a precursor to the “real” project.
In practice, it is where many of the project’s most consequential decisions are made.
Preparation should establish, among other matters:
- whether the underlying assumptions supporting the project are robust;
- whether the required land and rights can be secured;
- whether the regulatory requirements are sufficiently clear;
- whether environmental and social considerations have been properly assessed;
- whether the proposed procurement strategy is appropriate;
- whether the commercial model is viable;
- how material risks will be allocated; and
- whether the project has sufficient institutional capacity to proceed.
This is also the stage at which the project sponsor should determine whether there are any fundamental issues which should prevent the project from prpceeding.
That discipline is important.
There can be a tendency, particularly where political, institutional or commercial momentum has developed around a project, to regard the completion of preparatory studies as confirmation that the project should proceed.
It is not.
A feasibility study is an input into an investment decision. It is not a substitute for one.
Bankability is not the same as deliverability
The financing of infrastructure projects introduces another potential misconception.
A project may satisfy lenders’ requirements and therefore be considered bankable. That does not necessarily mean that the project is capable of being delivered efficiently.
Bankability principally concerns whether the project’s risks, revenues, contractual arrangements and security structure provide an acceptable basis for investment or debt financing.
Deliverability is broader.
It concerns whether the project can move from financial close to completion and ultimately to sustainable operations.
That requires consideration of matters such as:
Construction risk- Are the programme, costs and contractor obligations sufficiently defined?
Interface risk- Where multiple contractors, consultants, government agencies or project entities are involved, who is responsible when their respective obligations intersect?
Regulatory risk-Are approvals capable of being obtained within the project timetable, and is there an effective mechanism for monitoring continuing compliance?
Revenue risk-Are the assumptions supporting the project’s expected income sufficiently robust?
Operational risk-Will the asset be capable of performing as intended once commissioned? A sophisticated financing structure cannot compensate indefinitely for weaknesses in the underlying project.
Risk allocation must work in practice
Infrastructure contracts can contain extensive risk-allocation provisions. That does not necessarily mean that risk has been effectively allocated. The relevant question is whether the party contractually responsible for a particular risk is actually capable of managing it.
For example, allocating regulatory risk to a project company does little to resolve the underlying problem if the project company has no practical ability to influence the regulatory outcome.
Similarly, contractual provisions dealing with delay, cost overruns or performance may provide limited protection if the underlying project governance framework does not identify problems early enough for those provisions to be deployed effectively.
Good project documentation is therefore necessary, but not sufficient.
The contractual architecture must be supported by governance, reporting and decision-making mechanisms that enable the parties to identify and respond to emerging risks.
Stakeholder engagement is an investment issue
Infrastructure projects do not operate in a vacuum. They interact with communities, landowners, employees, regulators, government agencies, suppliers and other stakeholders whose interests may be directly or indirectly affected by the project.
Stakeholder engagement should therefore not be regarded principally as a communications exercise. For investors, it is a risk-management function. Poorly managed stakeholder relationships can result in delays, disputes, reputational damage, regulatory scrutiny and increased project costs.
This is particularly significant where projects involve land, natural resources, energy generation, transport corridors or other infrastructure with a substantial local footprint. The objective should not simply be to obtain stakeholder acquiescence. Rather, sponsors should seek to establish a credible framework for:
- identifying affected stakeholders;
- understanding material concerns;
- documenting commitments;
- allocating responsibility for those commitments;
- managing grievances;
- monitoring delivery; and
- maintaining engagement throughout the project lifecycle.
This approach moves stakeholder management from an ad hoc activity into the project’s governance structure.
The board’s role cannot end at financial close
For major infrastructure projects, the board and investment committee often devote considerable attention to whether a project should proceed. That scrutiny should not diminish once financing has been secured. Financial close is not the end of project risk. It is the point at which substantial financial exposure begins to crystallise. Boards should therefore have continuing visibility over matters including:
- material variations to project costs;
- delays against the approved programme;
- contractor performance;
- regulatory approvals;
- disputes and claims;
- land and access issues;
- environmental and social commitments;
- stakeholder concerns;
- financing covenant compliance; and
- changes to the project’s commercial assumptions.
The appropriate governance model will vary according to the nature and scale of the project. The principle, however, is consistent: material project risks should remain visible at the level responsible for protecting the investment.
A more disciplined approach to infrastructure investment
The lessons from recent scrutiny of infrastructure projects in Kenya extend beyond the particular projects under consideration. For project sponsors and investors, they point towards a more integrated approach to project development.
First, test the proposition before committing substantial capital.
The technical opportunity must be matched by a credible commercial rationale and a realistic assessment of the project’s constraints.
Second, identify legal and regulatory dependencies early.
Land, licensing, environmental requirements, procurement rules, approvals and contractual structures can materially affect both the timetable and economics of a project.
Third, align the financing structure with the delivery model.
The financing package should reflect the risks that the project will actually encounter, not merely the risks contemplated in a financial model.
Fourth, establish accountability for delivery.
Multiple advisers and counterparties should not result in ambiguity over who is ultimately responsible for achieving project outcomes.
Finally, treat governance as part of project design.
Governance should not be added after financial close. Reporting lines, decision-making authority, escalation procedures and risk oversight should be established as part of the project’s architecture.
The real measure of a successful project
There is an important distinction between starting an infrastructure project and delivering an infrastructure asset. A project may achieve financial close, commence construction and attract significant institutional support without necessarily achieving the outcomes contemplated at inception.
The more meaningful measure of success is whether the project can translate its original investment thesis into a functioning asset that delivers its intended economic, commercial and social value. That requires more than capital.It requires sound preparation, appropriate risk allocation, effective governance and disciplined execution.
For Kenya, where substantial investment will continue to be required across energy, transport, housing, water, manufacturing and other infrastructure sectors, the quality of project preparation and governance will be as important as the availability of finance.
The enduring lesson is therefore straightforward:
Infrastructure investment should be governed as a lifecycle, not a transaction.
The strongest projects are not necessarily those with the most sophisticated financing structures or the largest capital commitments. They are those in which commercial objectives, legal requirements, financial assumptions, stakeholder interest and delivery responsibilities have been considered as part of one coherent project architecture.
That is where investability becomes deliverability.
Manoah & Company Advocates advises investors, project sponsors, developers, contractors and institutions on the legal and commercial aspects of infrastructure development and investment.
Our work spans project structuring, commercial contracting, procurement, regulatory compliance, land and development matters, project governance, risk allocation and stakeholder consideration.
We approach infrastructure projects with an understanding that legal advice must ultimately support the commercial objective: a project that can be financed, delivered and sustained.
